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Nicholson: Effect of Disability of Landowner with Respect to the Acquisition

EFFECT OF DISABILITY OF LANDOWNER WITH
RESPECT TO THE ACQUISITION OF ADVERSE
RIGHTS BY ANOTHER BY STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS, PRESUMPTION OF A
GRANT, AND PRESCRIPTIVE
RIGHT IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
INTRODUCTION

Both corporeal and non-corporeal interests in land may be
affected by possession or use adverse to that of the landowner. South Carolina law recognizes two distinct types of
adverse possession affecting corporeal interests. The first
type is the presumption of a grant; this doctrine is part of
the common law, and exists independently of any statute.'
The second type is statutory, and is the result of the various
statutes of limitations in force in the jurisdiction. The acquisition of incorporeal rights by adverse user is referred to as

the acquisition of easements in land by prescription. 2
The purpose of this note is to discuss the effect of the
various disabilities of the owner of South Carolina land with
respect to the acquisition of interests adverse to the landowner by the three foregoing types of adverse possession
or user.
PRESUMPTION OF A GRANT

The common law presumption of a grant is based upon the
theory that after a long period of peaceful possession, the possessor, or those under whom he holds, will be presumed to
have entered under a valid grant, now lost. This is a pure
legal fiction, impelled by the desire of the law to quiet the
title to and the possession of real property. In South Carolina,
twenty years peaceful possession, adverse to the holder of
the paper title, is sufficient to raise this presumption. 3 It is
apparently necessary that the period run the full twenty
years; possession for sixteen years has been held insuffi1. The Trustees of Wadsworth Poor School v. McCully, 11 Rich. 424
(S. C. 1858); McLeod v. Rogers, 2 Rich. 19 (S. C. 1845).
2. Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S. C. 1, 66 S. E. 117
(1910).
3. Haitheock v. Haitheock, 123 S. C. 61, 115 S. E. 727 (1922);
Sutton v. Clark, 59 S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 150 (1900).
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cient. 4 The twenty-year period was originally adopted by
analogy to the twenty-year statute of limitations in effect at
that time, but in this state the presumption has nothing to do
with the statute of limitations, being based entirely upon a
presumed grant. 5 It was early held in this jurisdiction that
this presumption was one of fact, and was rebuttable." However, this view was overruled by later cases, and the law is
now settled that the presumption is one of law, and is not
rebuttable.7
The grant is presumed to have been made at or before the
beginning of the twenty-year period. Therefore, the original
entry must be presumed to have been rightful, rather than
tortiousS The heir, grantee, or devisee of the original presumptive grantee then must be presumed to have taken a
valid interest in the land. In this way it is reasoned that the
periods of possession of several successive adverse holders of
the property may be added together, or "tacked," to constitute
the necessary twenty-year period, if the parties so tacking
are in privity, and if the possession of these holders is continuous. 9
It is said that a grant will not be presumed against one
who is incapable of making such a grant.10 Thus this type of
adverse possession will not run against one under a disability.
The grant is presumed to have been made at or before the
beginning of the twenty-year period, and it would seem that
in order for the landowner to be protected because of his disability, it would be necessary for him to show that such disability existed at the time the grant is presumed to have been
made. If the landowner is of sound mind at the beginning
of the period, but becomes insane five years later, he still
would have been able to make a valid grant at the time the
period began to run. However, in this jurisdiction the landowner will be protected in the event of a subsequent dis4. Anderson v. Hughes, 5 Strob. 74 (S. C. 1850).
5. Shubuick v. Adams, 20 S. C. 49 (1883); Trustees of Wadsworth Poor School v. McCulley, 11 Rich. 424 (S. C. 1858).
6. McLeod v. Rogers, 2 Rich. 19 (S. C. 1845); Simmons v. Parsons,
2 Hill 492 (S. C. 1829).
7. Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S. C. 61, 115 S. E. 727 (1922) ; Lewis
v. Pope, 86 S. C. 285, 68 S. E. 680 (1910).
8. Adams v. Adams, 220 S. C. 131, 66 S. E. 2d 809 (1951) ; Ellen v.

Ellen, 16 S. C. 132 (1881).
9. Lewis v. Pope, 86 S. C. 285, 68 S. E. 680 (1910) ; Powers v. Smith,

80 S. C. 110, 61 S. E. 223 (1908).
10. Spears v. Oakes, 4 Rich. L. 347 (S. C. 1851); Habersham v. Hopkins, 4 Strob. 238 (S. C. 1850).
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ability. No period during which the landowner was under a
disability may be included in computing the twenty-year
period." Hence, disabilities may be tacked in order to defeat
the presumption of a grant.
The reasoning of the courts here must be that the true
justification of the presumption is that after the landowner
and his predecessors have slept on their rights for twenty
years, they should not now be allowed to dispossess those who
have been in peaceful enjoyment of the land for so long a
time. The courts will not look harshly upon the failure to sue
if the person entitled to bring such suit is under a disability.
The courts, in tolling the running of the period because of a
subsequent disability, can therefore overlook the logical fallacy they must necessarily encounter if they should literally
follow the theory of the presumption of a lost grant.
The disabilities which the courts recognize as protecting
the landowner from the running of this twenty-year period
are not necessarily the same as those recognized by the statute
of limitations. Cases in this state have recognized infancy 12
and coverture 13 as such disabilities, although coverture is no
longer recognized. 1 4 Insanity is provided for as a disability
in the statute of limitations, 5 and there have been at least
two cases arising under such provisions ;1o but the writer has
been unable to find a case in this jurisdiction involving insanity in relation to the presumption of a grant. Insanity
would seem to be a greater disability than coverture. A married woman was, even in past generations, quite likely to be
cognizant of her rights, and to be able to have them acted
upon, whereas an insane person might very well be totally
unaware of the status of his proprietary affairs, as was evidently the case in Cleveland v. Jones.'7 No case has been
found from South Carolina involving imprisonment of the
landowner. Absence beyond the seas has been expressly repudiated as being a disability such as would stop the running
11. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3 (1896); Massey v.
Adams, 3 S. C. 254 (1871).
12. Fore v. Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706 (1912); Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3 (1896).
13. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3 (1896).
14. Ibid.
15. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-128.

16. Cathcart v. Hopkins, 119 S. C. 190, 112 S. E. 64 (1921); Cleveland v. Jones, 3 Strob. 379 (S. C. 1837).
17. 3 Strob. 379 (S. C. 1837).
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of the period,18 even though such absence was treated as a
disability by the statute of limitations in effect at the time
of that decision. 19
The fact that an infant, or person under other disability,
cannot be presumed to have made a grant does not affect the
possibility, or the presumption, of a grant from his cotenant.
The defense of infancy is personal to the infant, and cannot
protect his cotenants from such a presumption.20
STATUTORY ADVERSE POSSESSION

The first English statute of limitations which provided that
no action could be brought for the recovery of real property
after the party bringing the action, or his predecessors, had
been out of seizin for a certain number of years was enacted in 1540,21 but this statute applied only to the old real
actions, and was not applicable to the action of ejectment. 22
The earlier statutes had specified a particular date, rather
than a definite period of years, after which the complaining
party or his predecessor must have been seized in order to,
maintain the action.23 The statute which is the basis of the
American statutes of limitations is that of James 1,24 enacted
in 1623. This statute, which in effect included the action of
ejectment within its limitations, allowed twenty years within
which to bring an action for the recovery of real property.
Five disabilities were provided for: infancy, insanity, coverture, absence beyond the seas, and imprisonment. It was provided that persons under any of these disabilities at the time
of the accrual of the cause of action, or their successors in
title, could bring suit within ten years after the removal of
the disability, or within ten years after the death of the person
so disabled.
The first statute of limitations enacted in South Carolina
was enacted in 1697. This law was repealed in 1712, and the
statute itself has been lost.25 The statute of 171226 barred ac18. Godfrey v. Schmidt, Cheves' Eq. 57 (S. C. 1840).
19. 2 STAT. AT LARGE, p. 583 (S. C.). This provision remained in

force until repealed in 1870. 14 STAT. AT LARGE § 4-96 (S. C. 1870).
20. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3 (1896).
21. 32 Henry VIII. c. 2.
22. 4 TIFFANY, THE LAW

1 WALSH,

COMMENTARIES

(1947).
23. Ibid.
24. 21 James I. c. 16.
25. 2
26. 2

STAT. AT LARGE,
STAT. AT LARGE,

OF REAL PROPERTY, Sec. 1133 (3d ed. 1939);
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Sec. 15

ON

p. 130 (S. C.).
p. 583 (S. C.).
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tion after five years adverse possession. It was provided
that those persons under coverture, or imprisoned, or out of
the province could bring suit within seven years, instead of
five years, after the accrual of the cause of action. Infants
were allowed until two years after reaching majority within
which to bring their actions; this period being extended to
three if the infants were beyond the seas. Insane persons
were allowed one year after their return to sanity, two if
overseas. Of course, these persons could still sue any time
within five years after the accrual of the right to sue. This
early statute recognized that insanity and infancy were the
more important disabilities; infants and persons non compos
mentis could not be barred while their disabilities continued.
In 1788, the time after reaching majority within which an
infant was allowed to bring his action was extended from two
years to five years. 27 In 1824, the statute was changed to
allow ten years to the landowner to bring his action, instead
of the previous five years.28 Also enacted in 1824 was a provision that the statute of limitations was not to be construed
to defeat the rights of minors, where the statute had not
barred that right in the lifetime29of the ancestor before the
accrual of the right to the minor.
In 1870, all the old statutes of limitation were repealed and

a new set enacted."0 The new statute allowed the landowner

twenty years within which to recover his property. 31 Provision was made for the disabilities of infancy, insanity, and
imprisonment for a term less than life. 32 Persons so disabled
at the time of the accrual of the cause of action were allowed
to sue within twenty years, or within ten years after the removal of the disability. In 1873, the general period of limitations was reduced to ten years, and the period of the exception in favor of those disabled reduced to five years.33 In
1882, the period allowed after the removal of a disability was
changed from five years to ten, the general period remaining
ten years;34 these periods of limitation have remained unchanged, and are the law today.
5 STAT. AT LARGE, p. 77 (S. C.).
6 STAT. AT LARGE, p. 238 (S. C.).
Ibid.
14 STAT. AT LARGE, § 4-96 (S. C. 1870).
14 STAT. AT LARGE, §§ 4-101, 4-102 (S. C. 1870).
32. 14 STAT. AT LARGE, § 4-111 (S. C. 1879).
33. 15 STAT. AT LARGE, p. 491 (S. C.).
34. S. C. CODE CIV. PROC., 1882 Sections 101, 108.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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As the most important of the statutes of limitations stands
today, it provides that no action shall be brought or defense
maintained founded on the title to real estate, unless the party
so doing, or his predecessor in title, was seized of the premises
within ten years before the commencement of the action. 35
Anyone under twenty-one years of age, insane, or imprisoned for a term less than life at the time of accrual of the
action may sue within ten years of such time; or he may sue
within ten years after the removal of such disability; or his
successor may sue within ten years after the death of the
party so disabled. 6 The fact that the landowner is absent
from the state affords him no protection under this statute
of limitations. 37 In addition, it is provided that in suits by
or against enemy aliens, the period of the continuance of the
war shall not be a part of the period limited for the commencing of an action.38 This last provision is not found in the
article of the code dealing specifically with actions for the
recovery of real property, but is found rather in the preceding
article dealing with the general provisions of the chapter

concerning limitations upon civil actions. 9 The writer has
discovered no cases in which this section has been construed.
Civil actions are divided in this chapter into only two classes:
actions for the recovery of real property, and actions other
than for the recovery of real property. The general provisions
of the chapter must then apply to both types unless expressly
provided otherwise, and this particular provision must certainly be applicable to actions for the recovery of real estate
as well as to other actions.
The justifications of the statute of limitations is that after
the landowner has neglected to guard his rights, in that he
has failed to bring an action within an ample period of time
after the accrual of the cause of action, he should not be
allowed to imperil the claim of another to the property; after
such a passage of time, documents may have been lost or
destroyed, memories may have become inaccurate and uncertain, and death may have silenced potential witnesses, resulting in the increased possibility of an unjust verdict. 40
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sections 10-124, 10-126.
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-128.

Maccaw v. Crawley, 59 S. C. 342, 37 S. E. 934 (1900).
CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-108.
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-101, et seq.
4 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Sec. 1134 (3d ed. 1939);
1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, See. 16 (1947);
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Adverse possession under the statute of limitations is based
upon a seizin or possession which is tortious from its very

inception. 41 Since the adverse possessor's seizin is tortious,
he has no valid legal interest in the land until the ten-year
period has run. He can convey or devise no interest which
is good as against the landowner. One entering into possession under such an attempted conveyance or devise has no
interest in the land, and his entry upon the premises is a new
and distinct trespass, giving rise to a fresh cause of action
on the part of the landowner. The ten-year period then must
begin to run anew. Thus an adverse possessor cannot add,
or "tack," the period of his possession to that of a previous
adverse possessor, even though the possession be continuous,
and there be privity between the two. 42 The rule in most states

is that periods of possession may be tacked when there is
privity between the parties so tacking,4 3 but the foregoing

is the view followed in this jurisdiction.
The case is considered different when one in adverse possession of land dies and leaves an heir. The heir is considered
to be automatically substituted for the ancestor by law without breaking the continuity of possession; it is not a new
entry, or another trespass. No new cause of action accrues
to the landowner, and the running of the statute is not tolled.
Thus adverse possession can be tacked between ancestor and
44
heir in South Carolina.

Under the ten-year statute of limitations, the person entitled
to commence an action to recover land must show a disability
existing "at the time such title shall descend or accrue" in

order to prevent the running of the statute.45 Once the statute
has begun to run, it will not be stopped by the incidence of a
subsequent disability.

40

BASWELL, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION, Sec. 7

(1889).

41. Adams v. Adams, 220 S. C. 131, 66 S. E. 2d 809 (1951); Ellen v.
Ellen, 16 S. C. 132 (1881).
42. Terwilliger v. Daniels, 222 S. C. 191, 72 S. E. 2d 167 (1952);
Adams v. Adams, 220 S. C. 131, 66 S. E. 2d 809 (1951).
43. 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession Sec. 128 (1950); 1 AM. JUR., Adverse Possession Sec. 151 (1940).
44. Terwilliger v. Daniels, 220 S. C. 131, 66 S. E. 2d 809 (1951);
Goings v. Mitchell, 110 S. C. 380, 96 S. E. 612 (1918).
45. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Section 10-128.
46. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-105; Cathcart v.
Hopkins, 119 S. C. 190, 112 S. E. 64 (1921) ; Milton v. Pace, 85 S. C. 373,
67 S. E. 458 (1909).
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In the early case of Rose v. Daniel,47 1814, it was held that
the statute of limitations could not run against an infant heir,
even though the statute had begun to run during the lifetime
of the ancestor. This case was overruled in 1818 by the case
of Faysoux v. Prather,in a three to two decision. 48 In 1821,
in the case of Cook v. Wood,49 the Court was divided on the
point, and the case was decided on other grounds. In 1824,
the legislature passed a bill8 0 apparently intended to decide
the controversy in favor of the ruling in Rose v. Daniel. In
Gibson v. Taylor,51 decided in 1826, the Court held that the
legislature intended by that provision to settle the law so
that when the ancestor, against whom the statute of limitations has already commenced to run, dies and the property
passes to a minor heir, the statute would be suspended during
the minority of the heir.
This statute of 1824 was repealed in 1870.2 The law is
settled under the present statute to be that the infant heir
will not be protected by reason of his infancy, when the statute has already begun to run during the lifetime of the ancestor, 53 although if there is a new trespass while they are
still infants, they will not be barred from their right to bring
an action on the new trespass until after the removal of their
disability. 54
In the event the ancestor is under a disability at the time
his cause of action accrues, and remains so until his death,
and the title then passes to his heir, who is under a disability,
it is undecided in South Carolina, so far as the writer can discover, whether the statute begins to run at the death of the
ancestor, or whether it is prevented from commencing to run
until the heir reaches majority. The statute provides that the
action must be brought within ten years "after the death of
the person entitled who shall die under such disability."55
From the wording of the statute, it would seem that the period
begins to run against the heir at the time of the death of the
47. 3 Brev. 438 (S. C. 1814).
48. 1 Nott and McCord 296 (S. C. 1818).
49. 1 McCord 139 (S. C. 1821).
50. 6 STAT. AT LARGE, p. 238 (S. C. 1824).
51. 3 McCord 451 (S. C. 1826).
52. See note 29 supra.
53. Frady v. Ivester, 129 S. C. 536, 125 S. E. 134 (1924); Fore v.
Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706 (1912); Satcher v. Grice, 53 S. C. 126,
31 S. E. 3 (1898).
54. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3 (1896).
55. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARoLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-108.
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ancestor. This is the result reached in the English case of
Doe v. Jesson, decided in 1805.56 However, Eaton v. Sanford,r a Connecticut case decided in 1807, held that no time
would begin to run against an heir under a disability; in this
case the landowner was allowed to recover although the property had been held adversely for nearly sixty years. Griswold
v. Butler,55 a later Connecticut case, ignored this decision and
followed Doe v. Jesson. The rule laid down in Doe v. Jesson
has been followed in this country. 9 Even in light of the
wording of the S. C. statute, 6 this writer believes the view
followed in Eaton v. Sanford to be the better view."1 The land
could not be so retained by a succession of owners dying and
inheriting under disabilities, because the forty-year statute
of limitation 2 would give good title at the end of that time.
If two or more disabilities, such as infancy and insanity,
exist in the landowner at the time the cause of action arises,
he is protected from the running of the statute until all such
disabilities have been removed, 63 there being no reason why
the landowner should be in a less favorable position because
he had other disabilities than that which becomes the last to
be removed.
If the landowner is under one disability, such as infancy,
at the time of the trespass, and then falls under another
disability, such as coverture, before the removal of the first
disability, the statute begins to run at the removal of the first
disability. 64 The statute of limitations does not provide for the
tacking of disabilities, and in order for the landowner to take
advantage of a given disability, that disability must have
existed at the time of the accrual of the right of action. 65
56. 6 East 80, 102 English Reports 1217 (1805); See Griswold v.
Butler, 3 Conn. 227 (1820) ; DeHatre v. Edmunds, 200 Mo. 246, 98 S. W.
744 (1906); Field v. Turner, 56 N. M. 31, 239 P. 2d 723 (1952); Jackson
v. Houston, 84 Tex. 622, 19 S. W. 799 (1892).
57. 2 Day 523 (Conn. 1807).
58. 3 Conn. 227 (1820).
59. DeHatre v. Edmunds, 200 Mo. 246, 98 S. W. 744 (1906); Field
v. Turner, 56 N. M. 31, 239 P. 2d 723 (1952); Jackson v. Houston, 84
Tex. 622, 19 S. W. 799 (1892).
60. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-128.

61. See the dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227
(1820).
62. COD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-129.

63. COD oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-106.
64. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-105; Robertson
v. Wurdeman, 2 Hill 324 (S. C. 1834); Starke v. Starke, 3 Rich. 438
(S. C. 1829).
65. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sections 10-105, 10-128.
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If, therefore, a cause of action for the possession of land
should accrue to the landowner at the age of seventeen, and
he should become insane at nineteen, his right of action would
be barred when he reached thirty-one, whether still insane
or not.
The possession of one cotenant is the possession of all, and
the disability of one cotenant will protect the title of the others against the running of the statute of limitations. 6 This
rule applies to tenants in common, and to joint tenants as

well. 17 An early case held that the statute would be prevented from running by the minority of tenants born after
the adverse possession had already begun, where the statute
had never commenced to run by reason of the minority of
other cotenants. 68 In other words, the successive minorities
of cotenants will bar operation of the statute. In this manner, it would appear that an estate in land could be protected
perpetually from extinguishment by adverse possession; but,
as stated above, 609 cotenancy with a minor does not protect
an adult from the presumption of a grant. Whether the infancy of a cotenant born after the statute has commenced
to run against the other cotenants will be any protection to
either the infant himself or to the other cotenants has apparently not been decided in South Carolina. In most instances
this situation would probably be held to come within the rule
that the descent of title to an infant heir does not stop the
statute once it has commenced to run.
FORTY YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

So far, this discussion of the acquisition of corporeal interests in land by statutory adverse possession has been
mostly concerned with the sections of the code constituting
the ten-year statute of limitations. In addition to this statute,
South Carolina has a statute"° providing that "no action shall
be commenced in any case" for the recovery of real property
against one in adverse possession thereof under a claim by
virtue of a written instrument, unless the person so claiming,
or those under whom he claims, were in possession within
forty years before this action is brought. The statute also
66. Adams v. Adams, 220 S. C. 131, 66 S. E. 2d (1951); Haley v.
White, 216 S. C. 360, 58 S. E. 2d 88 (1950).
67. Hill v. Sanders, 4 Rich. 521 (S. C. 1851).
68. Ibid.
69. See page 294 supra.
70. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-129.
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provides that the possession, sole or connected, of the defendant shall be deemed valid against the world after the lapse
of forty years. This statute is a limitation upon actions, and
also expressly gives good title.71 It is similar to, and must
have been adopted in contemplation of the English statute72
enacted in 1832 which expressly provides that no disabilities,
or succession of them, bar the statute. This fact, coupled with
the wording "to any case" leads to the conclusion that the
intent of the statute73 is to provide a statute of repose, which
will not be allayed by any personal disabilities, such as infancy, etc., on the part of the landowner. If such were not
the intent, there would be little purpose in the statute. There
would be little difference between its effct and that of the
ten-year statute; it does allow tacking,74 but so does adverse
possession by presumption of grant. However, it will not run
against a remainderman who is unable to assert his rights
because of an intervening life estate, until the life estate
falls in and he is entitled to possession.75
TAX SALES
no action can be brought to recover land sold
By
by the sheriff or other proper officer, unless such action is
brought within two years from the date of the sale. It has
been held that the former landowner is not barred until two
years after the date on which purchaser goes into possession
under the tax deed. 77 The landowner could not bring an
action, in law, until the purchaser entered into possession.
"The statute did not intend to bar the taxpayer's right until
he had two years within which he could bring his action."7 8
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS TO

statute, 76

The statute does not apply where the tax deed is void on its
face,7 9 but "all defects, irregularities, informalities, errors
and omissions in antecedent proceedings of assessment, taxa71. Sutton v. Clark, 59 S. C.440, 38 S. E. 150 (1900).
72. 3 & 4 William IV c. 27, Sections 17 and 18.
73. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sections 10-124, 10-126.
74. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 10-129; Sutton

v.

Clark, 59 S.C. 440, 38 S.E. 150 (1900).
75. Bolt v. Sullivan, 173 S. C. 24, 174 S. E. 491 (1934); Mitchell v.
Cleveland, 76 S. C. 432, 57 S. E. 33 (1906).
76. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Sec. 65-2779.

77. Leysath v. Leysath, 209 S. C. 342, 40 S. E. 2d 233 (1946) ; Glymph
v. Smith, 180 S.C. 382, 185 S.E. 911 (1936).
78. Gardner v. Reedy, 62 S.C.503, 40 S.E. 947 (1902).
79. Walker v. Williams, 212 S.C. 32, 46 S.E. 2d 249 (1948); Leysath
v. Leysath, 209 S.C. 342, 40 S.E. 2d 233 (1946).
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tion, and sale, which are not jurisdictional, are cured and
foreclosed when the statute has run." 80
It was held in the leading case of Jones v. Boykin l that
the tax statute under discussion was a pure statute of limitations, barring the remedy, but not the right, and must therefore be affected by the infancy of the landowners. This case
was upheld in the decision of Glymph v. Smith, 2 and apparently approved in Haley v. White.8 3 The same reasoning, it
would seem, should apply to other types of disability.
There are apparently no cases deciding whether a disability
will protect the landowner against the statute 4 providing that
an entry upon land is not to be deemed valid as a claim unless
an action be brought thereupon within one year after the
entry, or against the statute"5 providing that the second action to recover real property must be brought within two
years after the termination of the first. The point was raised
in the case of Benbow v. Levi,8 6 but the case was decided upon
the ground that two unsuccessful actions had already been
brought, rather than upon the question of the lapse of time
between these two actions.
PRESCRIPTION
The acquisition of incorporeal hereditaments by adverse
user for the prescriptive period is based upon the fiction of a
lost grant.8 7 The period is twenty years, the same as for the
presumption of a grant of corporeal interests. There are three
essential elements for the prescription of an easement in this
jurisdiction: continued and uninterrupted use for twenty
years, the identity of the thing enjoyed, and that the use or
enjoyment be adverse or under claim of right.8 , This prescriptive right may arise in the public.8 9
This presumption of a lost grant arises from the acquiescence of the landowner, and it would be unfair to deal
harshly with the acquiescence of an infant, who is supposed
80. Walker v. Williams, 212 S. C. 32, 46 S. E. 2d 249 (1948).
81. 70 S. C. 309, 49 S. E. 877 (1904).
82. 180 S. C. 382, 185 S. E. 911 (1936).
83. 216 S. C. 360, 58 S. E. 2d 88 (1950).
84. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
85. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952

Sec. 10-127.
Sec. 10-125.

.86. 50 S. C. 120, 27 S. E. 655 (1897).
87. Blume v. Southern Railway Co., 85 S. C. 440, 67 S. E. 546 (1908).

88. Babb v. Harrison, 220 S. C. 20, 66 S. E. 2d 457 (1951); Steele v.
Williams, 204 S. C. 124, 28 S. E. 2d 644 (1944).
89. Savannah River Lumber Co. v. Bray, Supervisor, 189 S. C. 237,
200 S. E. 760 (1939).
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by law to be either ignorant of his rights, or incapable of
9
as
enforcing them. Bacon is quoted in Lamb v. Crosland
saying "The rights of infants are much favored in law, and
regularly their laches shall not prejudice them, upon the presumption that they understand not their rights, and that they
are not capable of taking notice of the rules of law so as to
apply them to their advantage." In Lamb v. Crosland the
principle was laid down that no period during the infancy of
the landowner can be included in the twenty years necessary
for the presumption of a grant, and the law concerning disabilities in relation thereto appears to be the same.
EFFECT IN REMAINDER OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST
THE LIFE TENANT

It is well settled that adverse possession against a holder
of a legal life estate will not affect the rights of the holder of
a legal estate in remainder, 91 or in reversion.92 The remainderman has no right to sue until the falling in of the life
estate and neither the statute of limitations nor the presumption of a grant will commence to run against him until that
time.
It is also settled that adverse possession runs against the
legal title, and if the trustee is barred, the cestui que trust is
also barred. 93 The cestui que use is not thus barred without
ever having had the opportunity to assert his rights, since
he may go into equity and force the trustee to protect his interests.
In the case of Hunter v. Hunter,94 decided in 1901, the
Court, without discussing the point, held that adverse possession could not run against the trustee, because some of the
cestuis que trust were infants. However, this case is a dubious authority in light of earlier decisions which held that this
fact would not prevent the running of the statute.9 - Further,
it was held in Pope v. Patterson,96 a later case decided in 1907,
90. 4 Rich. 536 (S. C. 1851).
91. Crotwell v. Whitney, supra; Bolt v. Sullivan, 173 S. C. 24, 174

S. E. 491 (1934); Rice v. Bamberg, 59 S. C.498, 38 S. E. 209 (1900).
Where trust is passive as to both life tenant and remainderman, the
same will apply. Rawls v. Johns, 54 S.C. 394, 32 S.E.451 (1899).
92. Floyd v. Page, 129 S.C. 301, 124 S.E. 1 (1924).
93. Wells v. Coursey, 197 S. C. 483, 15 S.E. 2d 752 (1941) ; Moyle v.
Campbell, 126 S. C. 180, 119 S.E. 186 (1923).
94. 63 S. C. 78, 41 S. E. 33 (1902).

95. Benbow v. Levi, 50 S. C. 120, 27 S. E. 655 (1897) ; Long v. Cason,

4 Rich. Eq. 60 (S.C. 1851).

96. 78 S. C. 334, 58 S.E. 945 (1907).
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that the fact that the eestui que trust was under a disability
could not keep adverse possession from running against the

trustee and barring her interest. That the rule makes no
exception for disability was approved in Wells v. Coursey,
but it is not clear whether there were beneficiaries under disability.
When there is a legal life estate, with a remainder held in
trust, neither the trustee nor the equitable remainderman can
sue for possession, and adverse possession against the life tenant will not run against them.9 8 If the life estate is in trust,
but the remainder in fee is a legal estate, free from any trust,
it would seem that the remainderman should be in a position
no different from that of the remainderman after a legal life
estate, and his interest should not be adversely affected until
after the termination of such life estate.
Where the trustee holds legal title to both the life estate
and remainder, and adverse possession is completed against
the life estate, it appears that since the statute actually runs
against the legal title, which is altogether held by the trustee,
that the title of the trustee is completely barred, and with it
both the equitable life estate, and the equitable estate in remainder. This has the effect of barring the interest of the
equitable remainderman even though he has never had a right
of entry. This rule was first clearly announced in regard to
an action to recover real property in Young v. McNeill,99
though it was decided in Benbow v. Levi'0 0 that the remaindermen were barred by the unsuccessful result of the two actions brought by the trustee to recover land before any right
had accrued to the said remaindermen. These cases were followed in Pope v. Patterson,01 the next case in which the
02
question arose. The Court in the case of Breedin v. Moore,
1909, seemingly disapproved of the result reached in Young
v. McNeill and Pope v. Patterson,but did not pass on this
point, deciding the case rather on the ground that the statute
of uses had placed the legal title in the life tenant, so that
the remaindermen would not be barred. However, when the
97. 197 S. C. 483, 15 S. E. 2d 752 (1941).
98. Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926); Breeden v.
Moore, 82 S. C. 534, 64 S. E. 604 (1909) ; Mosely v. Hankinson, 25 S. C.

519 (1886).
99. 78 S.
100. 50 S.
101. 78 S.
102. 82 S.

C. 143,
C. 120,
C. 334,
C. 534,

59
27
58
64

S. E. 986 (1907).
S. E. 655 (1897).
S. E. 945 (1907).
S. E. 604 (1909).
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question next came up in Boney v. Cornwell,'0 3 it was clearly
decided that the equitable remaindermen would be barred in
such a case. The later case of Moyle v. Campbell,104 1923,
also clearly passed on this point, following Boney v. Cornwell.
Kirton v. Howard'0 5 held that although the trustee had the
complete legal title, it was presumed under the facts that he
had conveyed a legal life estate to one of the beneficiaries,
as was his duty under the trust, and that the adverse holding
had been only against the life tenant. Wells v. Coursey, 0 6
1941, seems to have settled the question in accordance with
the rule barring the cestui que trust in remainder, adding that
such remaindermen would be barred even though under a disability.
Another case in which adverse possession against the life
estate barred the remaindermen was the case of Milton v.
Pace.10 7 In that case the trust was for the use of a married
woman for life, and then to contingent remaindermen. When
the Constitution of 1868 removed the disability of coverture,
the statute of uses vested the legal life estate in the woman,
and left the remainder in trust. The adverse possession had
commenced to run against the trustees two years before the
constitution was adopted. The majority of the Court held that
the statute commenced to run against the trustee at that time,
and that no subsequent event could stop it, and that the remaindermen were barred.
WILLIAm J. NICHOLSON.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

121 S. C. 256, 113 S. E. 686 (1922).
126 S. C. 180, 119 S. E. 186 (1923).
137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926).
197 S. C. 483, 115 S. E. 752 (1941).
85 S. C. 373, 67 S. E. 468 (1909).
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